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PLAYING POLITICS WITH SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE: THE CASE FOR APPLYING 
FIDUCIARY LAW TO CORPORATE 
POLITICAL DONATIONS POST- 
CITIZENS UNITED 
Abstract: The 2010 midterm elections following the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Citizens United v. FEC saw a spike in contributions 
from outside (non-party) sources: these groups spent over four times as 
much as any other single midterm election cycle. This phenomenon un-
derscores both the psychological and competitive impact that Citizens 
United undoubtedly had on the political behavior of the American corpo-
ration. As more businesses begin to exercise their right to participate in 
political campaigns, directors and managers must still honor their fiduci-
ary responsibilities to the corporation and its shareholders. Against the 
backdrop of Citizens United and its apparent effects on corporate political 
spending, this Note explains how fiduciary law could serve as a check on 
the unbridled discretion enjoyed by corporate leadership to use general 
treasury funds for purely political ends. Fiduciary duties protect share-
holders’ investments from managerial self-interest and ensure that corpo-
rate leaders make careful, well-informed decisions that are truly in the 
best interests of the firm. To that end, shareholders could use these fun-
damental principles of corporate law to promote greater accountability 
and transparency when corporations become involved in highly conten-
tious political campaigns. 
Introduction 
 In 1919, two minority shareholders of the Ford Motor Corporation 
(“the Company”) sued Henry Ford—the Company’s Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and President—claiming that he was improperly using 
the company’s excess capital to produce cheaper cars and pay his em-
ployees better wages.1 The shareholders were John and Horace Dodge, 
who together would later become one of Ford’s chief competitors in 
                                                                                                                      
1 Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 670–71 (Mich. 1919); see Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should 
Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 163, 164–65 (2008) (arguing that the 
court’s language in Dodge represents bad law when used to support the idea that the sole 
purpose of the corporation should be to maximize shareholder wealth). 
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the automobile industry.2 Motivated by their short-term interests as 
shareholders of the Ford Motor Corporation and their long-term inter-
ests as Henry Ford’s prospective competitors, the Dodge brothers ar-
gued that the Company was required to distribute excess capital to its 
shareholders as dividends, rather than diverting its assets for other 
purposes.3 The Michigan Supreme Court agreed, requiring Ford to 
issue greater dividends to its shareholders.4 
 The court in Dodge v. Ford implied that Henry Ford exceeded his 
authority as president of the firm and dominant member of the board 
by using massive amounts of corporate funds for purposes other than 
the promotion of shareholder value.5 Over ninety years after Dodge, this 
rationale still resonates in American corporate law today.6 Although 
modern corporate law rules are extremely deferential to the discretion 
of corporate management, most courts still require that board deci-
                                                                                                                      
2 Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 283, 284 (1998) 
(questioning the dominance of shareholders in the corporate structure and arguing that 
workers should play greater roles in corporate governance). The Dodge brothers owned 
approximately ten percent of Ford’s entire capital stock; Ford himself owned fifty-eight 
percent of the Company’s stock. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 670–71. A key component of the 
Dodge brothers’ complaint was a statement Ford had made in a Detroit newspaper declar-
ing his true purpose in “reinvesting” Ford’s available capital back into the company: 
“My ambition . . . is to employ still more men; to spread the benefits of this 
industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up their 
lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our 
profits back into the business.” 
Id. at 671 (quoting Henry Ford). 
3 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 671, 673. 
4 Id. at 685. 
5 Id. at 684. The Dodge court’s conclusion is frequently cited in support of the “share-
holder primacy” model of corporate law, which regards shareholders’ interests in maximiz-
ing profits as the ultimate purpose of a corporation. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Pri-
macy Norm, 23 J. Corp. L. 277, 315 (1998) (challenging the prevailing view of the 
shareholder primacy norm in legal scholarship). 
6 170 N.W. at 685; see Smith, supra note 5, at 280 (“The assumption that the share-
holder primacy norm is a major factor in the ordinary business decisions of boards of di-
rectors of modern, publicly traded corporations is pervasive in modern corporate law 
scholarship.”). Some scholars point out that Dodge’s broader holding (that in making busi-
ness decisions, directors must consider profits alone, to the exclusion of all other constitu-
encies) has been unanimously discarded by contemporary courts. See Stout, supra note 1, 
at 166 (observing that since 1978, Dodge has been cited by Delaware courts only once---in 
an unpublished opinion in a case not concerning corporate purpose). These commenta-
tors argue that, read properly, Dodge stands for the proposition that a corporation’s pri-
mary purpose is to seek profits, but directors may also consider other interests incidental 
to the corporation’s business operations, such as charitable or humanitarian works. Id. at 
168; see, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(9) (Supp. 2010); A.P. Smith Mfg. v. Barlow, 98 
A.2d 581, 590 (N.J. 1953). 
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sions be made with the best interests of shareholders in mind.7 When 
non-shareholder constituencies8 cloud a board’s judgment, courts have 
been responsive to shareholders wielding fiduciary law as a legal basis 
to protect their ownership interest in the corporation.9 
 In January of 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Citizens United 
v. FEC—a case that has attracted significant attention from politicians, 
academics, and corporate leaders.10 As one might expect, the focus of 
the Citizens United debate has centered upon the “expressive” aspect of 
the ruling, and rightfully so.11 Little, however, has been written about 
the implications of Citizens United on corporate law and what the deci-
sion means for the shareholders of American corporations.12 Regard-
less of the First Amendment rights that the Court either created or vin-
dicated (depending upon one’s perspective), the debate over corporate 
political speech raises a fundamental corporate law question that hark-
                                                                                                                      
7 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 
1986). In the context of a corporate takeover, corporations’ boards are generally required 
to subordinate all interests to the goal of maximizing the sale price of the company. Id. In 
1986, in the seminal case of Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the Supreme 
Court of Delaware deployed the shareholder primacy norm, stating, “[W]e must conclude 
that under all the circumstances the directors allowed considerations other than the max-
imization of shareholder profit to affect their judgment . . . to the ultimate detriment of its 
shareholders. No such defensive measure can be sustained . . . .” Id. 
8 For example, the interests of employees, customers, the general public, or directors. 
9 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985). In 
the takeover context, see supra note 7, there is a special concern that a board will act in its 
own self interest, erecting defensive measures in order to protect its position of power. Id. 
(“Corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the corporation’s 
stockholders . . . .” (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939))). 
10 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010). For an excellent commentary on the decision, see Com-
ment, Citizens United v. FEC: Corporate Political Speech, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 75–76 (2010). 
See also infra notes 50–84 and accompanying text. 
11 See Heather K. Gerken, The Real Problem with Citizens United, Yale L. Sch. ( Jan. 22, 
2010), http://www.law.yale.edu/news/11178.htm. The decision has unquestionable sig-
nificance as a matter of policy and First Amendment law, see id., but the particular norma-
tive debate over whether the case was rightly decided is beyond the scope of this Note. 
Rather, this Note assumes that Citizens United is now the law, and instead offers a view on 
the new political spending regime through the lens of corporate law and the longstanding 
tradition of shareholder primacy. See infra notes 163–241 and accompanying text. 
12 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 
124 Harv. L. Rev. 83, 95 (2010) (focusing on the expressive significance of corporations’ 
political activity and how different voting rules could strike a better balance between the 
corporate political speech preferences of shareholders and management); Michael R. 
Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
161, 168 (2010) (arguing in favor of a “discourse” theory of the corporate firm in which 
shareholders have more say in the nomination and election of directors). 
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ens back to Dodge: does donating corporate funds to political cam-
paigns promote shareholder value?13 
 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, this 
Note discusses the growing need for greater oversight of directorial dis-
cretion when corporate leaders use money from their firms’ general 
treasuries to fund political advocacy groups.14 Given the Supreme 
Court’s current attitudes on this issue and the lack of adequate alterna-
tive remedies, this Note concludes that fiduciary law represents the last 
line of defense for shareholders in retaining some semblance of control 
over the political behavior of the American corporation.15 Through 
suits based on the fiduciary duty of loyalty and the doctrine of waste, 
shareholders should be entitled to sue directors for use of the corpora-
tion’s wealth for what is often a nonbusiness purpose.16 As with any 
method of promoting directorial accountability, however, several obsta-
cles stand in the way of these suits’ ultimate success, including Dela-
ware’s exculpation statute17 and the managerially-protective standards 
of the Delaware state courts.18 
 Part I of this Note discusses corporate political speech in the Unit-
ed States, summarizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United 
and examining what it could mean for corporations wishing to provide 
financial support to political campaigns.19 Part II outlines the existing 
state and federal corporate law rules that allow shareholders to partici-
pate in corporate political speech decisions, ranging from voting rights 
                                                                                                                      
13 See 170 N.W. at 685; see also Stern v. Gen. Electric Co., 837 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993), aff’d, 23 F.3d 746, 747 (2d Cir. 1994) (granting summary judgment for directors 
who allegedly wasted corporate assets by creating and administering a political action 
committee that supported a variety of political candidates); Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 
124 Cal. Rptr. 313, 320–21 (Ct. App. 1975) (concluding that a $10,000 corporate contribu-
tion to a group advocating against a ballot measure that would have increased the com-
pany’s taxes by over $1 million annually was not a gift and did not lack a corporate objec-
tive); Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1243, 1264 
(1999). 
14 See 130 S. Ct. at 886 (2010); see infra notes 163–241 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 212–241 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 212–241 and accompanying text. 
17 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010). Delaware law allows corpora-
tions to include a clause in their charters either limiting or eliminating directors’ liability 
for violation of the duty of care. Id. That statutory provision, however, explicitly does not 
excuse directors from liability for (1) breach of the duty of loyalty, (2) acts or omissions 
not in good faith, (3) intentional misconduct or knowing violation of law, or (4) transac-
tions in which a director derives an improper personal benefit. See id. 
18 See infra notes 124–149 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 25–84 and accompanying text. 
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to more drastic remedial tools such as derivative suits.20 This Part fo-
cuses on the law of Delaware—the predominant state of incorporation 
in the United States—and describes how recent Delaware decisions 
may influence directorial responsibility throughout the United States.21 
Finally, Part III presents evidence that political donations are frequently 
not in the best interests of a company and observes that internal mech-
anisms of corporate participation are currently inadequate to resolve 
inevitable conflicts between shareholders and management with re-
spect to these spending decisions.22 As a result, Part III concludes that 
fiduciary law is an appropriate and much-needed mechanism for ensur-
ing greater accountability to shareholders when directors23 elect to 
make corporations active participants in the highly divisive American 
political arena.24 
I. Corporate Political Speech and Citizens United 
 When the Supreme Court expanded First Amendment protections 
for corporate political speech in Citizens United in January 2010, much 
was written and spoken25 about the decision.26 Two years later, the full 
                                                                                                                      
20 See infra notes 85–162 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 85–162 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 163–241 and accompanying text. 
23 This Note uses the terms “directors” and “management” interchangeably to refer to 
the universe of corporate leaders who may be responsible for making or contributing to 
political speech decisions. See infra note 201. As will be discussed infra notes 154–156 and 
accompanying text, this may include directors, officers, and other corporate managers not 
within a company’s formal leadership. See infra note 201 (discussing the prevalence of 
American corporations allowing lower-level management to authorize political speech 
decisions on behalf of a company). 
24 See infra notes 163–241 and accompanying text. 
25 See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Report on the State of the Union Delivered to a 
Joint Session of Congress ( Jan. 27, 2010), in 156 Cong. Rec. S263, S266–67 (daily ed. Jan. 
27, 2010). President Obama delivered perhaps the most prominent criticism of the deci-
sion during the State of the Union address, just days after Citizens United was decided: 
With all due deference to separation of powers, last week the Supreme Court 
reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special in-
terests-–-including foreign corporations-–-to spend without limit in our elec-
tions. (Applause.) I don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by 
America’s most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities. (Applause.) 
They should be decided by the American people. And I’d urge Democrats 
and Republicans to pass a bill that helps to correct some of these problems. 
Id. 
26 See, e.g., Jess Bravin, Court Kills Limits on Corporate Politicking, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 
2010, at A1; Adam Liptak, Justices, 5–4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 
2010, at A1; Gerken, supra note 11. 
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implications of Citizens United for our democratic system of government 
and traditional principles of corporate behavior are still not completely 
apparent.27 Recent events, however, have revealed the growing en-
trenchment of corporate participation in the political arena.28 
A. Target Corporation: A Case Study in Corporate Political Speech 
 In the summer of 2010, news broke that Target Corporation (Tar-
get) had made a $150,000 donation to MN Forward—a Minnesota-
based political group that endorsed and paid for ads in support of the 
Republican candidate for Minnesota Governor, Tom Emmer.29 The 
problem for Target, though, was not—strictly speaking—the political 
affiliation of the candidate whose campaign it supported; rather, it was 
the candidate’s opposition to gay marriage that immediately generated 
significant antipathy on the part of many (formerly) loyal Target cus-
tomers.30 
 In response to the negative press, Target’s CEO Gregg Steinhafel’s 
principal justification for the donation was that the company was mere-
ly supporting an organization (and candidate) that would advance pol-
icies consistent with Target’s business goals.31 Many Target customers in 
                                                                                                                      
 
27 See Vinod K. Aggarwal, Campaign Spending Now Open for Business, Harv. Bus. Rev. 
Blog Network (Aug. 20, 2010, 9:50 AM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2010/08/campaign_ 
spending_now_open_for.html. Indeed, scholars have suggested that the decision was 
merely one more step in the direction the Court had already begun to move, rather than a 
new, radical restriction on Congress’s ability to limit corporate expenditures. See Gerken, 
supra note 11. As one such scholar put it, “Citizens United was just the last nail in the cof-
fin.” Id. 
28 See, e.g., Patrick Allen, Tea Party Calls for Duke CEO Jim Rogers’ Head, CNBC (Apr. 5, 
2011, 8:38 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/42428212/Tea_Party_Calls_for_Duke_CEO_ 
Jim_Rogers_Head; Emily Friedman, Target, Best Buy Angers Gay Customers by Making Contri-
bution to GOP Candidate, ABC News ( July 28, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/ 
target-best-buy-fire-campaign-contributions-minnesota-candidate/story?id=11270194. 
29 See Friedman, supra note 28. 
30 See id; see also Edward Lotterman, Real World Economics/Target’s Politics May Sink to the 
Bottom Line, Real World Econ. (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.edlotterman.com/2010/08 
/01/targets-politics-may-sink-to-the-bottom-line/. 
31 See Friedman, supra note 28. Target’s CEO Gregg Steinhafel said that the donation 
was wholly justified in an email to staffers subsequently reported by ABC News: 
Target has a history of supporting organizations and candidates, on both 
sides of the aisle, who seek to advance policies aligned with our business ob-
jectives, such as job creation and economic growth. . . . It is also important to 
note that we rarely endorse all advocated positions of organizations or candi-
dates we support, and we do not have a political or social agenda. . . . Let me 
be very clear, Target’s support for the GLBT community is unwavering, and 
inclusiveness remains a core value of our company . . . . 
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Minnesota and beyond, however, were not persuaded.32 They either 
refused to believe that job growth was truly the motivating concern be-
hind the donation or simply thought that donating corporate money to 
a group that opposed gay marriage was unacceptable even if it was 
genuinely aimed at promoting a more favorable economic climate for 
Target and its shareholders.33 
 Regardless of its true rationale, the donation to MN Forward and 
its aftermath led to an abundance of bad press for Target.34 In response, 
some groups organized formal boycotts of Target stores around the 
country;35 other customers ceremoniously tore up their Target credit 
cards.36 Although the particular expressions of disapproval varied 
among the formerly Target faithful, the effect on Target’s business was 
singular: the donation to MN Forward badly tarnished the company’s 
                                                                                                                      
Id. 
32 See id. 
33 See id.; see also Lotterman, supra note 30. 
34 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right That Big 
Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 639, 656–67 (2011) 
(discussing the dangers posed by corporate political involvement to a firm’s business). 
Political statements will win a corporation many enemies—enemies who can 
then boycott your products. The same political statements may win you some 
friends, but not friends who will double their purchases just because you have 
taken a stand they find favorable. Hence, the last thing that you want to do as 
a corporation is get involved with election campaigns when it is clear that no 
candidate embodies all the positions—and only those positions—that are ide-
al for the firm. Entering this swamp presents a real danger, and no sensible 
corporation should take that risky step. 
Id.; see also Lotterman, supra note 30 (describing the donation as a failure of basic market-
ing principles). 
Avoiding unnecessary public controversy and not taking actions that might 
compromise one’s brand identity are basic principles in marketing. Public re-
lations experts know and teach that consumer reactions to political stances 
are asymmetric. They tend to repel those who disagree with the stance much 
more than they attract those who agree. 
Lotterman, supra note 30. 
35 See Sara Yin, MoveOn.Org Calls for Target Boycott in New Ad (VIDEO), Huffington Post 
(Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/17/boycott-target-commercial_ 
n_684815.html?view=print (discussing one progressive group’s attempt to organize a boycott 
of Target by circulating a petition—with over 260,000 signatures as of August 17, 2010—from 
consumers vowing not to shop at Target stores). 
36 See Friedman, supra note 28 (describing one customer’s decision to tell her local 
Target store manager that she could not shop there anymore and to cut up her Target Visa 
card in response to learning of the $150,000 donation to MN Forward). 
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public image, and its sales reflected this reality.37 To make matters worse 
for Target, Tom Emmer—the candidate backed by MN Forward—lost 
the Minnesota gubernatorial election by a mere 8000 votes in the No-
vember 2010 election.38 
 On August 5, 2010, Steinhafel issued a letter to company employ-
ees formally apologizing for the adverse effects of the company’s dona-
tion.39 Target’s CEO reiterated his firm belief that “a business climate 
conducive to growth is critical to [Target’s] future,” but admitted fail-
ure in not foreseeing Target’s employees’ and customers’ negative reac-
tions to the donation.40 Yet, the most revealing part of Steinhafel’s 
statement was a reference to a “strategic review and analysis of [Tar-
get’s] decision-making process for financial contributions in the public 
policy arena.”41 Without a doubt, this reassurance was directed, in part, 
toward reclaiming the loyalty of Target’s scorned customers and em-
ployees.42 But ultimately, Steinhafel’s promise to reconsider Target’s 
political advocacy policies was aimed at the company’s investors—those 
keenly interested in knowing how Target’s management would ensure 
that a similar public relations disaster would never recur.43 
 Target’s ill-advised donation damaged the company in many ways, 
but from a corporate law (and shareholder) perspective, the greatest 
consequence of all was its harm to the company’s value.44 Not only did 
the donation carry a high risk of igniting public backlash, but objec-
                                                                                                                      
37 Tom Webb, Has Emmer Donation Cost Target on Stock Market?, St. Paul Pioneer Press, 
Aug. 4, 2010, at A5 (discussing Target’s $1.3 billion loss in stock market capitalization, a 
3.5 percent decline in share price between the morning of July 27—when news broke of 
the company’s donation to MN Forward—and mid-August). 
38 See Brian Montopoli, Republican Tom Emmer Concedes Minnesota Governor’s Race, CBS 
News (Dec. 8, 2010, 2:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20025030- 
503544.html. 
39 See Tom Scheck, Target CEO Apologizes for Donation to MN Forward, MPRNews (Aug. 5, 
2010, 12:58 PM), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/special/columns/polinaut/ 
archive/2010/08/target_ceo_apol.shtml. 
40 Id. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
43 See Tom Hamburger & Jennifer Martinez, Target Feels Backlash from Shareholders, L.A. 
Times (Aug. 19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/19/nation/la-na-target-share 
holders-20100820 (discussing the demands levied against the Target board by shareholders 
seeking to revamp the process by which Target decides whether to make donations to politi-
cal campaigns). 
44 Hamburger & Martinez, supra note 43; Webb, supra note 37; see also Allen, supra note 
28 (discussing the recent backlash against the CEO of Duke Energy from Tea Party group 
members for guaranteeing the 2012 Democratic National Convention a $10 million “line 
of credit” shortly after it decided to hold the Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina—
the Duke Energy headquarters). 
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tively speaking, the donation was also a gamble in its own right.45 If 
Emmer had ultimately been elected Governor of Minnesota, Target 
would have suffered in the court of public opinion, but would (theoreti-
cally) have benefited economically under the Republican’s leadership.46 
The realized alternative, however, carried the same public backlash, yet 
failed to provide an advantageous setting for Target’s economic 
growth.47 Framed in this way, the possible benefits of making the dona-
tion seem vastly outweighed by the significant potential for harm.48 Nev-
ertheless, after choosing such a potentially disastrous course for the 
company, Target’s shareholders must ask themselves whether their lead-
ership learned a lesson from the ordeal and, if not, whether continued 
investment in the firm is wise.49 
B. Corporate Political Spending Post-Citizens United 
 As the preceding look at Target’s recent foray into the American 
political sphere demonstrates, spending corporate funds on campaigns 
can be a risky endeavor for directors and shareholders alike.50 But in 
the past century, criticism of corporate political spending has focused 
largely on the harm that unbridled donations would inflict on the pub-
lic, rather than the damage a corporation might inflict on itself.51 In-
deed, corporations wishing to support political campaigns are subject 
to extensive regulation and reporting requirements, and even outright 
                                                                                                                      
45 See Friedman, supra note 28. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. 
49 See Hamburger & Martinez, supra note 43. 
50 See id. (discussing institutional investors’ demands that corporations “consider how 
contributions will affect the company’s public image, business sales and profitability, and 
whether a candidate espouses policies that conflict with the company’s values”). Calls from 
shareholders for greater accountability are the natural consequences of management mak-
ing campaign contribution decisions without adequately vetting the candidates. See id. 
Powerful shareholders recognize the need for greater oversight in this area and are trying 
to protect themselves against the harmful effects of these ill-advised decisions. See id. 
51 See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). As 
Justice Thurgood Marshall—writing for the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in its 1990 
decision Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce—wrote, a major concern surrounding 
corporate political donations is “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-
tions of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have 
little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Id. In 
other words, corporations that receive privileges from the state (such as limited liability 
and perpetual existence) are uniquely able to accumulate wealth; therefore, there is a 
serious concern that corporations will use those advantages to influence the political proc-
ess in a way that elevates their interests at the expense of individual citizens. See id. 
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bans in some instances.52 Although the Supreme Court has addressed 
the constitutional implications of restricting corporate political spend-
ing on the federal and state level many times over the past century,53 
this Section focuses on the specific changes since the Court’s ruling in 
Citizens United to better understand how that case may affect corporate 
political behavior in the future.54 
 To begin, a brief discussion of the factual and legal framework of 
the case is warranted to inform the inquiry into the appropriate legal 
response that follows.55 Citizens United is a non-profit corporation with 
an annual budget of approximately $12 million, funded primarily by 
donations from individuals and, to a lesser extent, donations from for-
profit corporations.56 In January 2008, as the primary season leading 
up to the presidential election began, Citizens United produced and 
released a ninety-minute film entitled Hillary, criticizing Senator Hillary 
Clinton, a Democratic candidate for President.57 As part of its plan to 
distribute the film, Citizens United sought to make Hillary available 
                                                                                                                      
52 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1) (2006) (requiring any person who spends more than 
$10,000 on electioneering communications within a calendar year to file a disclosure 
statement with the Federal Election Commission (FEC)); id. § 441b (banning all direct 
corporate contributions to candidates); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913–14 (up-
holding the constitutionality of the disclaimer and disclosure restrictions of the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 as applied to Citizens United’s video, Hillary). 
53 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913–14; McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 209 
(2003) (upholding a federal law prohibiting corporations and unions from using their 
general treasury funds to finance “electioneering communications”); Austin, 494 U.S. at 
660 (upholding a Michigan campaign finance law requiring corporations to make all in-
dependent political expenditures through a separate fund comprised of money raised 
specifically for political purposes, rather than from a corporation’s general treasury); First 
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (striking down a state statute that 
prevented corporations from making political contributions directed at influencing the 
outcome of ballot measures). In many of these cases, the Court has refused to enforce 
categorical bans on corporate political speech, while showing greater willingness to uphold 
lesser restrictions such as reporting or disclosure requirements. See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 
S. Ct. at 897 (“The law before us is an outright ban, backed by criminal sanctions.”); Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. at 776. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, Justice Lewis Powell, writing 
for the majority, observed, “The proper question therefore is not whether corporations 
‘have’ First Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with those of natu-
ral persons. Instead, the question must be whether [section] 8 abridges expression that the 
First Amendment was meant to protect. We hold that it does.” Id. 
54 See 130 S. Ct. at 913; Gerken, supra note 11 (arguing, in the greater context of the 
Court’s recent jurisprudence, that the Citizens United decision was merely one step in the 
direction the Court had been heading and that its greater significance was its refusal to 
define “corruption” as expansively as it had previously; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 
910 (“[I]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption.”). 
55 See infra notes 163–241 and accompanying text. 
56 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886–87. 
57 Id. at 887; see also Comment, supra note 10, at 76. 
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through a video-on-demand service provided by certain cable compa-
nies.58 
 At the time, federal law prohibited corporations and unions from 
directly contributing to political candidates’ campaigns or from making 
independent expenditures advocating a candidate’s election or defeat 
through any form of media.59 The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002 (BCRA or, as it is also known, McCain-Feingold) amended this law 
to prohibit any “election communication,” defined as “any broadcast, 
cable, or satellite communication” that refers to a political candidate 
and is released within thirty days of a primary or sixty days of a general 
election.60 Citizens United wanted to release Hillary through on-
demand cable television services within thirty days of the 2008 Democ-
ratic primaries, but were concerned that, under McCain-Feingold, it 
would be subject to civil and criminal penalties.61 
 Instead, Citizens United filed suit for declaratory and injunctive 
relief against the Federal Election Commission (FEC),62 and the Su-
preme Court ultimately heard the case.63 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Anthony Kennedy concluded that, even though corporations could 
speak through political action committees (PACs), 2 U.S.C. § 441b’s 
restrictions on corporate, independent expenditures constituted a full 
ban on corporate speech and was therefore unconstitutional.64 As a 
partial justification for the decision, Justice Kennedy noted that im-
proved disclosure requirements reduced the need for more restrictive 
                                                                                                                      
58 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. 
59 Id.; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006). 
60 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A), 441b(b)(2); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. 
61 See 2 U.S.C. §§ 437g, 441b; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888. 
62 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888. Citizens United argued that § 441b was unconstitu-
tional as applied to Hillary and that BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure requirements were 
similarly unconstitutional. Id. 
63 Id. First, the District Court denied Citizens United’s motion for a preliminary in-
junction, granting summary judgment in favor of the FEC. Citizens United v. FEC, Civil 
Action No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 875. Next, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction 
and the case was reargued, followed by supplemental briefing on whether the Court 
should overrule its 1990 decision in Austin and parts of its 2003 decision in McConnell. 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888; Comment, supra note 10, at 78; see McConnell, 540 U.S. at 
209 (upholding a federal law prohibiting corporations and unions from using their gen-
eral treasury funds to finance “electioneering communications”); Austin, 494 U.S. at 668–
89 (upholding a Michigan campaign finance law requiring corporations to make all inde-
pendent political expenditures through a separate fund comprised of money raised spe-
cifically for political purposes, rather than from a corporation’s general treasury). 
64 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. The court also overruled McConnell, which upheld 
section 203 of BCRA’s extension of section 441b’s restrictions on corporate independent 
expenditures. Id.; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 209. 
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laws on corporate expenditures that may have been more pressing at 
the time McCain-Feingold was enacted.65 
 In the years following Citizens United, commentators have debated 
how corporate political behavior might change as a result of the deci-
sion.66 On its face, the holding appears to be a relatively modest expan-
sion of corporations’ First Amendment rights: corporations still may 
not donate directly to candidates’ campaigns and must adhere to FEC 
disclosure rules.67 Beyond its black letter holding, however, Citizens 
United provides clear evidence of the Court’s current views on corpo-
rate political speech and might signal even further erosion of limits on 
that speech in the near future.68 
 After the decision was handed down, evidence has begun to accu-
mulate showing that total spending connected to political campaigns 
was growing exponentially and confirming many commentators’ pre-
dictions that Citizens United’s impact on corporate political spending 
would be significant.69 After the smoke cleared following the midterm 
elections of 2010, statistics strongly suggested that political spending in 
the United States was, indeed, on the rise.70 Outside groups71 contrib-
                                                                                                                      
65 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916. 
66 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 95; Donald B. Tobin, CEOs Shouldn’t 
Use Corporate Treasury as Personal Political Piggy Bank, Roll Call (Nov. 1, 2010, 12:07 PM), 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/-51140-1.html. 
67 See Comment, supra note 10, at 81. 
68 See Gerken, supra note 11 (explaining that the Court’s conception of “corruption” 
may only include “quid pro quo” corruption—a much narrower definition than that 
adopted in the past that would significantly limit Congress in how and when it could regu-
late corporate political expenditures). 
69 See Michael Beckel & Megan R. Wilson, BREAKING: Election 2010 Outside Political 
Spending Officially Eclipses Such Expenditures From 2004 Cycle, Center For Responsive Pol. 
(Oct. 28, 2010, 1:43 pm), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/10/breaking-outside-
spending-this-seas.html. The Center for Responsive Politics reports that outside groups 
(excluding party committees) spent nearly $305 million during the 2010 midterm elec-
tions to produce and broadcast advertisements, make phone calls, and distribute litera-
ture. 2010 Outside Spending, Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
outsidespending/index.php?cycle=2010&view=A&chart=N (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
The 2010 total eclipsed all prior election cycles, including the 2008 elections, featuring a 
close presidential race between Barack Obama and John McCain. See id. 
70 See 2010 Outside Spending, supra note 69. 
71 “Outside groups” here refers to groups not affiliated directly with a candidate or po-
litical party (for example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is a prominent outside group). 
2010 Outside Spending, supra note 69. As might be expected, party committees led the way 
in spending in 2010; the Democratic and Republican Congressional and Senatorial Cam-
paigns were four of the top six contributors for the election cycle (the two outside groups 
were the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Action Network). See 2010 Outside 
Spending, by Groups, Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/outside 
spending/summ.php?cycle=2010&chrt=V&disp=O&type=A (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
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uted more money to the 2010 midterm elections than they did during 
both the 2004 and 2008 presidential election cycles, each of which fea-
tured a hard-fought presidential race.72 Not only was the nearly $305 
million total the most ever spent by outside groups on a single midterm 
election, it was more than four times the amount spent in the next-
highest-paying midterm election cycle—$69 million in the 2006 Con-
gressional elections.73 
 Furthermore, outside groups have been increasingly less willing in 
recent years to disclose their contributions to political campaigns.74 Ac-
cording to the Center for Responsive Politics, outside groups support-
ing candidates in the 2010 midterm elections disclosed the sources of 
their funding at the lowest rate in twenty years.75 In 2004, by contrast, 
ninety-six percent of these groups provided full disclosure of these 
sources.76 Since that time, this number fell to seventy percent in 2008 
and a mere fifty-three percent in 2010.77 In the last midterm elections, 
nearly forty-four percent of outside groups provided no disclosure 
whatsoever as to the source of their funding, and the remaining groups 
provided only partial disclosure.78 
                                                                                                                      
 
72 See 2010 Outside Spending, supra note 69. 
73 See id. Furthermore, between 2004 and 2008 (two presidential election years), non-
committee spending increased by approximately 50%, from roughly $200 million to $302 
million. See id. In contrast, spending in the 2010 midterm elections (nearly $305 million) 
was up by more than 340% from spending in 2006 ( just under $69 million). See id. These 
statistics do not necessarily evidence a causal relationship between the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Citizens United and greater political contributions by American corporations, 
but the timing of this marked increase in outside spending in 2010 is compelling nonethe-
less. See id. 
74 See Megan R. Wilson, Who’s Buying This Election? Close to Half the Money Fueling Outside 
Ads Comes from Undisclosed Donors, Center for Responsive Pol. (Nov. 2, 2010, 6:09 PM), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/11/whos-buying-this-election.html; 2010 Outside 
Spending, supra note 69. 
75 See 2010 Outside Spending, supra note 69. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. A minority of organizations provide what the Center for Responsive Politics re-
fers to as “some disclosure,” but the proportion of these groups has been consistently small 
since 1990. See id. Organizations providing some disclosure were at their highest in 2006 at 
6.1%, but decreased to approximately 3.1% in 2010. See id. The prevailing practices, there-
fore, seem to either be full disclosure or no disclosure whatsoever, with the percentage of 
groups in each of these two categories equalizing over the past four years. See id. 
78 See id. Non-profit organizations classified as 501(c) groups under the U.S. tax code 
are not required to disclose the sources of their donations. See Wilson, supra note 74. In 
contrast, non-profits affiliated with political groups such as political action committees 
(PACs) must disclose their donor lists. See id. One of the largest and most financially in-
volved 501(c) groups in the 2010 midterm elections was the U.S. Chamber of Commerce 
(“the Chamber”), which ranked fourth in total spending (about $33 million), behind only 
the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (about $66 million), the National 
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 During the lead up to the 2012 elections, however, this trend has 
reversed, as over ninety-three percent of outside groups have provided 
full disclosure of the sources of their donations.79 The apparent reason 
for this marked departure seems to be the rise of so-called “Super 
PACs,”80 which are permitted to raise and spend unlimited funds on 
independent expenditures, but are required to periodically disclose 
their donors to the FEC.81 Super PACs have been the dominant organ-
izational form for conducting political advocacy in the months leading 
up to the 2012 Presidential election, and as such, the full disclosure 
rate has nearly doubled since 2010.82 
 Ultimately, the real significance of Citizens United—and the extent 
to which corporations will be emboldened by it to become more active 
in political endeavors—will continue to unveil itself in the years to 
come.83 If, as many expect, corporations begin to occupy a greater 
space in our nation’s political discourse, a legitimate question arises as 
to how this activity will comport with the purpose of the corporation 
and the fiduciary obligations held by directors as representatives of 
shareholder interests.84 
II. American Corporate Law Rules Governing Shareholder 
Involvement in Political Speech Decisions 
 Shareholders of U.S. corporations may express dissatisfaction with a 
corporation’s political speech decisions in one of two general ways: (1) 
through internal mechanisms of corporate governance and (2) through 
external legal remedies available to them when management violates 
                                                                                                                      
Republican Congressional Committee (about $46 million), and the Democratic Senatorial 
Campaign Committee (about $41 million). See 2010 Outside Spending, by Groups, supra note 
71. The Chamber outspent the National Republican Senatorial Committee ( just under 
$26 million), which finished sixth behind the Chamber and the American Action Network 
(about $26 million), in addition to the three organizations listed above. See id. 
79 Outside Spending by Disclosure, Excluding Party Committees, Center for Responsive 
Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) [hereinaf-
ter 2012 Outside Spending by Disclosure]. 
80 As of late February 2012, Super PACs were responsible for $51 million of the nearly 
$60 million (85%) spent by nonparty outside groups in the months leading up to the 2012 
Presidential election. Outside Spending, Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opense- 
crets.org/outsidespending/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Outside Spending]. 
81 Super PACs, Center for Responsive Pol., http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/super 
pacs.php?cycle=2012 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). Specifically, Super PACs are required to 
report the sources of their donations on a monthly or quarterly basis, whichever the or-
ganization chooses. Id. 
82 2012 Outside Spending by Disclosure, supra note 79. 
83 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 85. 
84 See id. at 83, 93. 
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the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders.85 The former class of reme-
dies allows shareholders, albeit in somewhat circumscribed ways, to 
voice their concerns directly with management.86 External legal reme-
dies, on the other hand, represent a “last resort” for shareholders when 
the procedures of corporate democracy have failed them and they must 
rely on state corporate law to redress their concerns.87 Section A of this 
Part discusses a shareholder’s options when seeking to change a corpo-
ration’s political speech policies from within and highlights the atten-
dant benefits and limitations of this course.88 Section B delves into state 
fiduciary law, with an emphasis on the law of Delaware—the most influ-
ential jurisdiction for corporate law in the United States.89 
A. Internal Pathways for Shareholders to Control Corporate Political Speech 
 Shareholders of a corporation may avail themselves of several ave-
nues to influence that company’s political speech decisions without re-
sorting to legal actions; they may submit proposals aimed at changing 
these decisions,90 exercise their right to vote on various matters at the 
corporation’s annual meeting (including the election or removal of 
directors),91 and—if all else fails—sell their shares.92 
 First, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has declared 
that under certain circumstances, shareholders may submit proposals 
to corporations for consideration and, if accepted, these proposals will 
be voted on at the annual shareholder meeting.93 In order to be eligi-
ble to submit a proposal, a shareholder must have continuously owned 
at least $2000, or one percent of a company’s securities for one full 
year, through the date of the meeting.94 Furthermore, any individual 
shareholder may only submit one proposal per meeting, and the pro-
                                                                                                                      
85 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794–95 (1978); Bebchuk & Jack-
son, supra note 12, at 86 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010)). 
86 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 86. 
87 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795. 
88 See infra notes 90–113 and accompanying text. 
89 See infra notes 114–162 and accompanying text. 
90 See SEC Shareholder Proposals Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). 
91 See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of 
Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 445, 451 (2008). 
92 Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and 
Progressive Possibilities 52 (2006); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911 (“There is, 
furthermore, little evidence of abuse that cannot be corrected by shareholders ‘through 
the procedures of corporate democracy.’”(quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 794)). 
93 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). 
94 Id. The proposing shareholder must also be a “registered holder” of the securities. 
Id. 
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posal may not exceed five hundred words.95 Even if these procedural 
requirements are met, a board may exclude a shareholder proposal 
from consideration at its annual meeting for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding if the proposal concerns a matter relating to a company’s ordi-
nary business operations.96 
 Some scholars have argued that proposals aimed at curbing or 
eliminating political contributions would most likely fail thanks to the 
broad exclusionary provisions adopted by the SEC.97 Specifically, pro-
posals concerning political speech could very well be considered “relat-
ing to the company’s ordinary business operations” and therefore not a 
proper subject for shareholder involvement.98 Furthermore, even if 
                                                                                                                      
95 Id. 
96 Id. The rationale behind this particular exclusion is that shareholders have dele-
gated the responsibility for the day-to-day operations of the company to the management; 
to that end, shareholders should not be entitled to use the proxy as a means of interfering 
with ordinary business decisions entrusted to a company’s capable leadership. See id. 
A properly submitted proposal may be excluded if: (1) it is not a proper subject for ac-
tion by shareholders under the laws of the state of incorporation, (2) it would cause the 
company to violate any state, federal, or foreign law, (3) it would violate the SEC’s proxy 
rules (including Rule 14a-9, prohibiting issuance of materially false or misleading state-
ments), (4) it concerns a personal claim or grievance against the company and is aimed at 
obtaining a personal benefit that is not shared by the shareholders at large, (5) it is irrele-
vant to the company’s principal business operations, (6) the company would lack the au-
thority to adopt the proposal, (7) it deals with a matter relating to the company’s ordinary 
business operations, (8) it relates to nomination or election of directors, (9) it conflicts 
with one of the company’s own proposals submitted to shareholders, (10) it has already 
been substantially implemented, (11) it substantially duplicates another proposal that will 
be included in the proxy materials for the same meeting, (12) it deals substantially with 
the same subject matter as another proposal that failed in previous years, or (13) it relates 
to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends. Id. 
97 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 87 (arguing that such proposals would be 
subject to the same rules as ordinary business decisions, therefore effectively eliminating 
any role shareholders might play in shaping corporate policy in the political arena); Katri-
na Kuh, Anti-Green ($$) Shareholder Resolutions—A Remedy to Citizens United?, PrawfsBlawg 
(May 11, 2010, 1:11 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/05/antigreen-
shareholder-resolutions-a-remedy-to-citizens-united-.html (observing that proposals could 
be excluded because they do not relate to the principal business operations of the com-
pany or, alternatively, because they account for less than five percent of its total assets at 
the end of the most recent fiscal year). 
98 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(7) (2011); Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 87. In-
terestingly, the SEC recently issued a no-action letter indicating that it may have reversed 
its previously held policy of classifying corporate political contributions as subject to exclu-
sion as “ordinary business decisions.” See The Home Depot, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 
(Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/ 
2011/northstarasset032511-14a8.pdf. If shareholder proposals aimed at restricting political 
involvement are no longer subject to exclusion by a company’s board, this could substan-
tially increase shareholder participation in—and oversight over—these important deci-
sions. See id. 
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such decisions were deemed outside the ordinary business of the cor-
poration and not excluded by the board, spending caps or other re-
strictions on political donations would most likely take the form of 
“recommended” action and would thus be nonbinding on the board.99 
 Second, shareholders may exercise their right to vote on matters 
presented to them at a corporation’s annual meeting.100 As might be 
inferred from the familiar phrase “one share, one vote,” each share-
holder of a corporation is typically entitled to one vote for every 
share101 of the company that he or she owns.102 Today, many share-
holders’ portfolios are widely diversified and attendance at the annual 
meetings for every company in which shareholders own stock is func-
tionally impossible.103 As a result, voting is dominated by the proxy 
process in which shareholders assign their voting rights to an interme-
diary who represents their interests at a company’s annual meeting.104 
Of course, a shareholder’s right to voice concerns with a corporation’s 
political involvement assumes that proposals involving political contri-
butions may not be excluded by the board;105 given the low success rate 
of these proposals even in reaching a vote, use of the proxy is, at best, 
an extremely limited tool for shareholders to voice concerns about the 
wisdom of a corporation’s political involvement.106 
                                                                                                                     
 Finally, shareholders may exercise control over corporate decision 
making with regard to political campaign donations by selling their 
shares, or “voting with their feet.”107 If enough shareholders express 
 
99 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 87–88. In 2004, shareholders of American 
International Group (AIG) submitted a proposal to the board requesting that it prepare a 
report containing AIG’s policies regarding political contributions, including “a business 
rationale for each of AIG’s political contributions” and “the identity of the person . . . in-
volved in making decisions with respect to AIG’s political contributions.” Am. Int’l Grp., 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2004 WL 346068, at *1 (Feb. 19, 2004). In response to the 
board’s request to omit the proposal, the SEC found that the proposal was not related to 
the company’s ordinary business operations within the meaning of its regulations and thus 
required AIG to submit the proposal to its shareholders. See id. 
100 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 91, at 463. 
101 It should be noted that today, not all “shares” carry single voting power. For exam-
ple, owners of “preferred stock” have no voting rights unless a triggering event occurs. See 
id. at 482. But once that event occurs, each preferred share may have multiple “common 
share” votes in order to compensate for the occurrence of the triggering event (such as a 
failure to pay dividends). See id. 
102 See id. at 463. 
103 See Greenfield, supra note 92, at 25. 
104 See Hayden & Bodie, supra note 91, at 460. 
105 See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text. 
106 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 88. 
107 See Greenfield, supra note 92, at 239. 
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their disapproval of a board’s unsuccessful entry into the political arena 
by selling their shares, the stock price of the company will fall; this col-
lective action may serve as a corrective force and prevent undesirable 
business decisions.108 This was likely the case for Target, as its share 
price declined by 3.5 percent in the months following public disclosure 
of its donation to MN Forward.109 There are numerous drawbacks to 
this option, however, not the least of which is that the shareholder who 
sells shares never enjoys the benefits that accompany a corporation’s 
improved leadership.110 
 Although these internal pathways may, at the outset, appear to be 
the most direct and efficient way to influence a corporation’s political 
spending policies, a closer examination of how these internal corporate 
law rules function in practice (taken up in Part III) reveals how hollow 
they often are.111 Some scholars advocate the expansion of shareholder 
voting rights in order to provide investors with a voice when it comes to 
using corporate funds for political purposes.112 But until that happens, 
shareholders are limited to the internal processes discussed above to 
express their dissatisfaction with corporate leadership.113 
B. Fiduciary Duties, Derivative Suits, and the Law of Delaware 
 Another more drastic remedial tool for shareholders is filing a law-
suit against the company’s directors and officers.114 These suits are 
based on the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders by the directors and 
officers of the corporation.115 These duties flow from the imbalance of 
control between management and shareholders; fiduciary duties pro-
                                                                                                                      
108 See id. 
109 Webb, supra note 37. 
110 See Greenfield, supra note 92, at 239. 
111 See infra notes 190–211 and accompanying text. 
112 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 97. 
113 See id. at 117. 
114 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795; see also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 nn.36–
37 (Del. 2009) (holding “explicitly” that officers of corporations owe the same fiduciary 
duties of care and loyalty to shareholders as do directors). The Delaware Supreme Court 
has observed that, although officers and directors of Delaware corporations owe identical 
fiduciary duties to shareholders, the consequences of breach of fiduciary duty may be dif-
ferent for these two groups. See Gantler, 965 A.2d. at 709 n.37. Delaware state law permits 
corporations to include a provision in its certificate of incorporation exculpating its board 
of directors from liability from breaches of the duty of care; therefore, the Court implied 
that, when a corporation has exculpated its directors from liability, identical breaches of 
the duty of care by directors and officers could lead to liability for the latter, but not for 
the former. See id. 
115 See Greenfield, supra note 92, at 135. 
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vide assurance to shareholders that directors will act competently and 
in shareholders’ best interests (duty of care), and will not take advan-
tage of their position of power for personal gain (duty of loyalty).116 
The strength of these duties, however, is tempered by the business 
judgment rule—a doctrine that provides management with wide lati-
tude in conducting the day-to-day business of the corporation.117 
 This Section addresses areas of fiduciary law that could provide 
shareholders with a legal basis for bringing derivative suits when man-
agement ostensibly abuses its discretion in designating corporate funds 
for political purposes.118 In this factual context, shareholders could 
base their claims on the doctrine of waste (a component of the broader 
duty of care) or the duty of loyalty.119 
 This discussion focuses on Delaware corporate law, which has been 
by far the most influential state corporate law over the past century.120 
                                                                                                                      
 
116 See Lawrence E. Mitchell & Dalia Tsuk Mitchell, Corporations: Cases and 
Materials 136–37 (2006) (providing an overview of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty). 
Speaking at a recent symposium on corporate law, Justice Carolyn Berger of the Delaware 
Supreme Court summarized the state of fiduciary law in Delaware: “We have the duty of care, 
the duty of loyalty, enhanced scrutiny [in the context of corporate takeovers], and the busi-
ness judgment rule.” Carolyn Berger, Good Faith After Disney: Justice Berger’s Closing Discussion, 
55 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 659, 663 (2010). Although it was unclear for some time whether the 
courts had established a third, independent fiduciary duty requiring directors to act in good 
faith, the latest opinions from the Delaware Supreme Court have cast that position in doubt. 
See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 244 (Del. 2009) (“[T]his record clearly estab-
lishes that the Lyondell directors did not breach their duty of loyalty by failing to act in good 
faith.”); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he obligation to act in good faith 
does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the du-
ties of care and loyalty. Only the latter two duties, where violated, may directly result in liabil-
ity . . . .”); Lawrence Cunningham, Delaware Back to Sturdy Doctrine; Good Faith in Coma, Con-
curring Opinions (Mar. 31, 2009, 10:28 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/2009/03/delaware_back_t.html (commenting that the alleged duty of good faith is 
currently neither dead nor alive after the court’s opinion in Lyondell). 
117 See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982). 
118 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795; Epstein, supra not 34, at 656 (“[I]t is an open question 
whether particular campaign contributions could be a violation of [board members’] du-
ties on the ground that they deal with matters unrelated to the interests of the corporation 
. . . .”). 
119 See infra notes 136–149 and accompanying text. 
120 See Greenfield, supra note 92, at 107. The statistics regarding Delaware’s domi-
nance in the area of corporate law are staggering: 
Delaware has a population less than one-third of one percent of the nation, 
but it is the state of incorporation of over 50 percent of U.S. public compa-
nies and 60 percent of the Fortune 500. . . . Over 300,000 companies are in-
corporated there, and 300 of the Fortune 500. The state with the second-most 
of the Fortune 500, New York, has only 25. In fact, so many companies incor-
porate in Delaware that incorporation and franchise fees provide one-quarter 
of its total state revenues. 
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This phenomenon is largely due to the “internal affairs” doctrine, 
which provides that the rules governing a corporation’s business affairs 
are dictated by the state in which the corporation is chartered.121 As 
such, because so many American corporations call Delaware “home,”122 
its corporate law governs companies that are headquartered and doing 
business in all fifty states; thus, Delaware’s corporate law rules are much 
more important than those of any other state.123 
1. The Business Judgment Rule 
 Any discussion of the fiduciary obligations owed by corporate 
management to shareholders must start with a bedrock principle: the 
business judgment rule.124 This deferential standard entitles directors 
of a corporation to considerable discretion in making decisions regard-
ing the day-to-day operation of a company.125 In effect, the rule insu-
lates management from shareholder suits for poor business decisions; 
unless shareholders can make a showing of bad faith or some other ex-
treme, fraudulent behavior, the business judgment rule usually pre-
cludes fiduciary claims.126 Even if this presumption in favor of man-
                                                                                                                      
 
Id. at 107–08. 
121 See id. at 108. 
122 This phenomenon is somewhat misleading, however, because the internal affairs 
doctrine allows companies that have little or no meaningful attachment to a state to incor-
porate there and benefit from its corporate law rules. Id. This is precisely the case in Dela-
ware: despite its enormous market share of incorporation for the largest public companies 
in the United States, “[o]nly two of the 300 Fortune 500 companies incorporated in Dela-
ware—DuPont and MBNA—have their headquarters actually sited in the state.” See id. 
123 See id. 
124 See Joy, 692 F.2d at 885; see also Mitchell & Mitchell, supra note 116, at 138–46 
(providing a thorough overview of the business judgment rule and several of its policy 
rationales). 
125 See Joy, 692 F.2d at 885. The Delaware courts have made it clear, however, that cer-
tain situations do not warrant strict application of the business judgment rule. See Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985). For example, in the con-
text of “poison pills,” or defensive measures adopted in response to takeover bids, the Del-
aware Supreme Court requires an additional showing before the protections of the busi-
ness judgment rule will apply. Id. at 954. “Because of the omnipresent specter that a board 
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its 
shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the thresh-
old before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.” Id. 
126 Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (App. Div. 1976). 
“In actions by stockholders, which assail the acts of their directors or trustees, 
courts will not interfere unless the powers have been illegally or unconscien-
tiously executed; or unless it be made to appear that the acts were fraudulent 
or collusive, and destructive of the rights of the stockholders. Mere errors of 
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agement is successfully rebutted by shareholder plaintiffs, the inquiry 
does not end there.127 Rather, the burden then shifts to the directors to 
show that the decision in question was “entirely fair to the corporation 
and its shareholders.”128 Therefore, shareholders will only prevail when 
they rebut the business judgment rule and the directors fail to show 
that a decision was fair.129 
 Several rationales have been advanced in support of the rule.130 
First, shareholders voluntarily assume a certain degree of risk that 
managers will make poor business decisions.131 Second, business deci-
sions should not be evaluated after the fact by courts.132 Finally, argua-
bly the acceptance of, and desire for, risk is critically important to a 
company’s profitability, and risky decisions should not be deterred 
through shareholder suits.133 
 Although political donations may not appear related to a corpora-
tion’s day-to-day operations, the reach of the business judgment rule is 
extremely broad; for this reason, rebutting the rule is the most signifi-
cant obstacle to a shareholder suit.134 As Target learned firsthand, do-
nating general treasury funds to a political campaign can be an ex-
tremely risky endeavor; nevertheless, in most cases, the business 
                                                                                                                      
judgment are not sufficient as grounds for equity interference, for the powers 
of those entrusted with corporate management are largely discretionary.” 
Id. (quoting Leslie v. Lorillard, 18 N.E. 363, 365 (N.Y. 1888)). 
127 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). 
128 Id. 
129 See id. 
130 Joy, 692 F.2d at 885–86. 
131 Id. at 885. To a large extent, so the argument goes, shareholders have the freedom 
to research the management of a corporation before purchasing its stock, and existing 
shareholders are responsible for electing directors; therefore, diligent shareholders can 
avoid boards with potential to make bad business by not buying or voting. Id. 
132 Id. at 886. Otherwise, hindsight could hold business decisions to an impossibly high 
standard, making legitimate, informed strategies appear reckless in retrospect. See id. (“[A] 
reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years later against a 
background of perfect knowledge.”). 
133 See id. Many times, the greatest opportunity for large shareholder gains involves a 
high risk of loss; thus, because shareholders can reduce their overall risk by diversifying 
their investments, the law should favor—and encourage—risky business decisions, even if 
they frequently lead to significant losses. Joy, 692 F.2d at 886. 
134 See Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 313, 320–21 (Ct. App. 1975) (con-
cluding that a donation made by a utility to a group advocating the defeat of a ballot 
measure had a business purpose because the measure, if passed, would have increased the 
utility’s tax burden significantly); Thomas W. Joo, Corporate Governance and the Constitution-
ality of Campaign Finance Reform, 1 Election L.J. 361, 368 (2002). 
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judgment rule will shield these decisions as matters of business discre-
tion.135 
2. The Doctrine of Waste 
 One component of the fiduciary duty of care is a responsibility not 
to waste a corporation’s assets.136 To prevail on such a claim, sharehold-
ers must demonstrate that a corporation has relinquished corporate as-
sets and received so little consideration in return that the exchange falls 
“beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to 
trade.”137 For example, if a director donates corporate funds to a politi-
cal campaign, but the corporation receives enough consideration such 
that the exchange does not constitute “squandering” or “giving away” 
corporate assets (through the potential for favorable policies or legisla-
tion), the shareholders’ claim would fail under the waste standard.138 
                                                                                                                      
 
135 See Stern v. Gen. Electric Co., 837 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d, 23 F.3d 746 
(2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Marsili, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 319–21; Winkler, supra note 13, at 
1264. In general, it is difficult to argue that donating to political campaigns is a product of 
a rational business judgment because the likelihood of getting tangible returns on such 
disbursements is inherently speculative. See Webb, supra note 37. But cf. Stern, 837 F. Supp. 
at 79. 
136 See Orloff v. Shulman, No. Civ. A.852-N, 2005 WL 3272355, at *11 n.75 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 23, 2005) (citing Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997)) (reaffirming 
the standard for measuring corporate waste); Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336 (“Roughly, a waste 
entails an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so disproportionately small as to 
lie beyond the range at which any reasonable person might be willing to trade.”). An al-
ternative formulation for the waste standard has been discussed and reaffirmed in recent 
cases, as well. Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, C.A. No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at 
*35 n.299 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2010) (internal citations omitted) (“‘[W]here business judg-
ment presumptions are applicable, the board’s decision will be upheld unless it cannot be 
attributed to any rational business purpose.’” (quoting Disney, 906 A.2d at 74)). 
137 See Lewis, 699 A.2d at 336. But see Stern v. Gen. Electric Co., 924 F.2d 471, 476 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (discussing the standard for corporate waste under New York state law, requiring 
a showing of fraud or bad faith). In Stern v. General Electric Co., the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the directors of General 
Electric (GE) against a shareholder claiming waste of corporate funds in establishing and 
administering GE’s political action committee. 837 F. Supp. at 77. In addition to employ-
ing a substantively different waste standard than that used in Delaware (requiring fraud or 
bad faith), the court in Stern also required that plaintiff-stockholders show that directors 
intended to serve an outside interest in committing waste. Id. at 76 (citing Aranoff v. Al-
banese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (App. Div. 1982)). This suggests that the New York plaintiff 
in Stern would have needed to show some director self-interest to prevail; in contrast, a 
similar claim in Delaware would presumably be framed as a separate claim of violation of 
the duty of loyalty. See id.; infra notes 139–149 and accompanying text. 
138 Stern, 837 F. Supp. at 77; Disney, 907 A.2d at 693, 748–49; see Winkler, supra note 13, 
at 1264–65. As the Delaware Chancery Court pointed out in In re The Walt Disney Co. Deriva-
tive Litigation, however, this situation could give rise to liability outside the corporate waste 
context, perhaps for violations of the duties of care or loyalty, both of which could be sup-
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3. The Duty of Loyalty 
 Consistent with the imbalance of power that gives rise to the fidu-
ciary relationship between management and shareholders, the duty of 
loyalty requires that corporate management place the best interests of 
the corporation before its own.139 In this way, the duty creates wide-
spread trust in the marketplace for capital, decreasing inefficiencies by 
reducing the need of shareholders to incur monitoring or supervision 
costs.140 Specifically, this obligation generally requires that board deci-
sions be made by independent directors and that those directors carry 
out their duties in good faith, free from self-interest.141 
 Conflicts of interest often arise in the context of common business 
transactions, such as mergers or acquisitions.142 During such deals, a 
winning outcome for the director may be a losing outcome for the cor-
poration and its shareholders, thus resulting in a conflict of interest.143 
Another scenario that could give rise to loyalty concerns is the receipt 
by a fiduciary of a personal benefit flowing from a particular position of 
power.144 For example, if a director designates a particular sum of cor-
porate money for a political advocacy group led by a close friend, this 
might give rise to a violation of the duty of loyalty claim; the director 
would be exploiting a position of power to the detriment of the share-
                                                                                                                      
ported by the presence of bad faith. 907 A.2d at 749 n.422; see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 
457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
139 Mitchell & Mitchell, supra note 116, at 172. 
140 See id. at 172–73. 
141 See id. In Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, the Delaware Supreme Court issued one of 
its most recent opinions on the state of fiduciary law in Delaware. See 970 A.2d at 243–44. 
Because Lyondell’s certificate of incorporation included a provision insulating its directors 
from duty of care suits under section 102(b)(7), the court was limited to addressing poten-
tial duty of loyalty violations. Id. at 239; see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 
2010). Shareholders claimed that the directors breached their duty in failing to maximize 
the price of a merger accepted by the board, and were motivated by their own self interest 
(through cash received for their stock options) to complete the transaction. Lyondell, 970 
A.2d at 239. But the trial court resolved that the board was not “motivated by self-interest 
or ill will”; therefore, the decision fails to provide further insight into how Delaware courts 
might treat self-interested political donations. See id. 
142 See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
143 See Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (App. Div. 1944). For example, if a director sit-
ting on the board of company X owned target company Y, it would be in that director’s 
interest to maximize the sale price of Y which, in turn, would directly conflict with the 
interests of the shareholders of X (whom the director represents as a fiduciary), who 
would seek the lowest possible price for Y. See id. 
144 Disney, 907 A.2d at 751 (“The classic example that implicates the duty of loyalty is 
when a fiduciary . . . receives a personal benefit not shared by all shareholders.” (citing 
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993))). 
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holders—whose interests that director has a fiduciary obligation to rep-
resent.145 
 When directors abuse positions of power to further their own po-
litical or social views, shareholders could respond by alleging a violation 
of the duty of loyalty.146 From a doctrinal standpoint, this particular 
analysis is not generally limited by the business judgment rule.147 In 
other words, directors engaged in making self-interested political con-
tributions using funds from a corporation’s general treasury do not en-
joy a presumption that their dealings are fair.148 Rather, it is incumbent 
upon those directors to prove the good faith of the transaction and to 
show that it is fair to the corporation and its shareholders.149 
4. Delaware Statutory Law 
 Beyond the jurisprudence of the Delaware courts, that state’s legis-
lature has also shaped shareholder remedies flowing from fiduciary 
duty violations.150 Section 102(b)(7) of Delaware’s General Corpora-
                                                                                                                      
145 See Disney, 907 A.2d at 751; Tobin, supra note 66. 
146 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795 (“[M]inority shareholders generally have access to the 
judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements alleged to have 
been made for improper corporate purposes or merely to further the personal interests of 
management.”); David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social 
Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1197, 1228–29 (2011); Brian Stelter, 
Candidates Running Against, and with, Cable News, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 2010, at A24; Tobin, 
supra note 66 (discussing News Corporation CEO Rupert Murdoch’s recent donation of 
corporate funds to then-candidate for Ohio Governor John Kasich arising out of “friend-
ship” with the candidate). These claims have also been made by conservatives against cor-
porate leaders supporting the Democratic Party. Allen, supra note 28. For example, the 
President of FreedomWorks—a million-member Tea Party group—recently criticized Jim 
Rogers, the CEO of Duke Energy, for using company funds to attract the Democratic Na-
tional Convention to Duke’s home city of Charlotte, North Carolina: “‘Jim Rogers may like 
cozying up to Barack Obama to suit his own political appetites, but in his role as head of 
Duke Energy it is completely inappropriate and unacceptable . . . .’” Id. 
147 See Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 6. 
148 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795; Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 6. 
Such personal transactions of directors with their corporations, such transac-
tions as may tend to produce a conflict between self-interest and fiduciary ob-
ligation, are, when challenged, examined with the most scrupulous care, and 
if there is any evidence of improvidence or oppression, any indication of un-
fairness or undue advantage, the transactions will be voided. 
Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 6–7. 
149 See Bayer, 49 N.Y.S.2d at 6; Yosifon, supra note 146, at 1229 (“[W]here directors 
spend on behalf of causes that are pet projects . . . then corporate law provides a remedy 
through shareholder derivative suits that put the onus on directors to demonstrate that 
“interested” transactions were entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.”). 
150 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 2010). 
2012] Fiduciary Law and Corporate Political Donations 761 
tion Law allows corporations to insulate directors from monetary liabil-
ity for duty of care violations by including a provision to that effect in 
their charters.151 Alternatively, corporations may agree to purchase li-
ability insurance for directors as part of their compensation package.152 
The result of these practices is that the costs of duty of care violations 
are ultimately borne by the corporation and its shareholders, either 
through paying insurance premiums or by suffering the results of egre-
gious incompetence or intentional failures in managerial decision mak-
ing without meaningful recourse.153 
 An important caveat to this rule, however, is that section 102(b)(7) 
only applies to directors and does not protect officers or other corporate 
managers from liability.154 Furthermore, in 2009 the Delaware Supreme 
Court held explicitly in Gantler v. Stephens that corporate officers owe 
the same fiduciary duties to shareholders that directors do.155 There-
fore, it is possible that a claim of corporate waste brought against a 
group of directors and officers could be partially dismissed pursuant to 
section 102(b)(7), with the claims against the corporate officers surviv-
ing under the rationale set forth in Gantler.156 
 A second important statute adopted by the Delaware legislature 
permits shareholders to inspect the books and records of a corporation 
                                                                                                                      
151 See id.; Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 239. 
152 See § 102(b)(7). 
153 See Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 243–44; Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. 
154 Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709 n.37 (“Under . . . § 102(b)(7), a corporation may adopt a 
provision in its certificate of incorporation exculpating its directors from monetary liability 
for an adjudicated breach of their duty of care. Although legislatively possible, there cur-
rently is no statutory provision authorizing comparable exculpation of corporate offi-
cers.”); see also Berger, supra note 116, at 664–65. At a recent corporate law symposium, law 
professors asked Justice Berger of the Delaware Supreme Court why plaintiff-shareholders 
had not seized the opportunity to include corporate officers as defendants in derivative 
suits; Justice Berger replied: “I don’t know. I have no idea why they’re not doing it, other 
than that’s not part of the game plan that everybody is accustomed to, which is kind of a 
lame answer, but that’s the only way I can explain it.” Id. 
155 See Gantler, 965 A.2d. at 708–09 (“In the past, we have implied that officers of Dela-
ware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and that the 
fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors. We now explicitly so hold.” 
(citations omitted)). 
156 See id. at 709 n.37. This situation assumes that waste claims would fall under the 
broader duty of care, but the Delaware Chancery Court has held that whether a waste 
claim will be exculpated under section 102(b)(7) depends on whether the claim includes 
allegations implicating the duty of loyalty, such as a personal benefit. See Green v. Phillips, 
Civ. Action No. 14436, 1996 WL 342093, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. June 19, 1996) (dismissing a 
claim for waste under section 102(b)(7) because the plaintiff failed to allege self-interest 
or bad faith). For example, if a director makes a wasteful political donation for personal or 
ideological reasons, the director would not be immunized under section 102(b)(7). See id. 
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in certain circumstances prescribed by section 220 of the Delaware 
Code.157 Specifically, after making a written demand, shareholders have 
the right to inspect and make copies of a corporation’s stock ledger, list 
of stockholders, and “other books and records.”158 Shareholders must, 
however, have a “proper purpose” for such an investigation, defined by 
statute as a purpose reasonably related to the shareholder’s interest as a 
shareholder.159 Before shareholders can bring any claim against man-
agement for violating their fiduciary duties by donating company mon-
ey to political campaigns, obtaining thorough, reliable evidence of that 
wrongdoing is absolutely necessary.160 Given the meager disclosure re-
quirements currently in force in the United States and the demonstra-
bly lower rates of voluntary disclosure of sources of political campaign 
support in recent years,161 section 220 gives shareholders precisely the 
tool they need to uncover details of suspected wrongdoing if and when 
it occurs.162 
III. Fiduciary Law Is the Best Way to Reduce Harmful Political 
Spending Post-Citizens United 
 During the summer of 2010, news broke that the media corpora-
tion News Corporation (News Corp.) contributed $1 million from its 
corporate treasury to the Republican Governors Association (RGA) per 
CEO Rupert Murdoch’s wishes;163 this raised the specter of fiduciary 
duty violations to News Corp.’s shareholders.164 When asked about the 
                                                                                                                      
157 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 2010); Berger, supra note 116, at 663 n.9. 
158 § 220(b)(1). 
159 § 220(b). In the context of shareholder investigations into corporate wrongdoing, 
the Delaware Supreme Court has interpreted this standard as follows: “[A]ssuming the 
allegation is meritorious, the stockholder should be given enough information to effec-
tively address the problem, either through derivative litigation or through direct contact 
with the corporation’s directors and/or stockholders.” Saito v. McKesson, 806 A.2d 113, 
115 (Del. 2002). 
160 See § 220(b); Saito, 806 A.2d at 115; Berger, supra note 116, at 663. 
But what’s going on [with section 220] is that, on the one hand, if our courts 
are not open to stockholders because we’re just there for management, then 
we’re not doing our job and we’re not good for anybody. That may be nice 
for the companies, but the stockholders are not going to stand for it and the 
repercussions would be severe. 
Berger, supra note 116, at 663. 
161 Although disclosure rates may increase if the current patterns observed in the 2012 
election cycle continue through November. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
162 See § 220(b); Saito, 806 A.2d at 115; supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
163 Tobin, supra note 66; see Stelter, supra note 146. 
164 See Tobin, supra note 66. 
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donation, Murdoch explained: “The RGA [gift] was actually [a result] 
of my friendship with John Kasich[,]” then-candidate, now-Governor of 
Ohio.165 When a News Corp. spokesperson was asked about the dona-
tion, however, he defended the donation as support for the RGA’s “pro-
business agenda.”166 Later that year, it was revealed that the media cor-
poration had also contributed $1 million to the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce (“the Chamber”) during the summer leading up to the 
2010 elections.167 But because the Chamber is classified as a 501(c) 
non-profit organization, it was not required by law to reveal the identity 
of its supporters.168 
 Recent statistics suggest that situations like that described above 
may become more and more common in the United States after the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United v. FEC.169 Wheth-
er and how shareholders respond to personally motivated or wasteful 
corporate political spending could have a significant impact on politi-
cal spending practice, and could very well protect the value of their 
ownership interest.170 Drawing upon survey data of directors of many of 
the largest, most influential American corporations, Section A of this 
Part argues that, when corporations engage in political speech, they 
usually harm shareholder value.171 Next, Section B discusses why the 
internal mechanisms of shareholder involvement in political speech 
decisions as they currently stand are inadequate to ensure that share-
holder value remains management’s chief concern.172 Finally, in light 
of the preceding considerations, Section C concludes that claims based 
                                                                                                                      
165 Id. 
166 Ben Smith, News Corp. Gave Pro-GOP Group $1M, Politico (Sept. 30, 2010, 9:19 
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0910/42989.html. Beyond the apparent in-
consistency of these two statements, it is also unclear why News Corp. would choose not to 
report the donation. Id. It is similarly unclear why the company would be reluctant to dis-
close the donation if it truly had the salutary objective of fostering “pro-business” policies 
and legislation. See id. 
167 Id. 
168 Alexander Mooney, Report: News Corp. Gave $1M to Chamber of Commerce, CNN Poli-
tics (Oct. 1, 2010, 10:59 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/01/report-
news-corp-gave-1m-to-chamber-of-commerce/; see also supra notes 74–78 and accompany-
ing text. 
169 See 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010); supra notes 69–78 and accompanying text. 
170 See Webb, supra note 37. Merely investigating and pursuing shareholder suits could 
also accomplish this particular goal, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the case; this 
possibility will be discussed in greater detail infra. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); Berger, supra note 116, at 661 (describing the trial Dis-
ney directors endured as an “intermediate step” between finding and not finding liability). 
171 See infra notes 174–189 and accompanying text. 
172 See infra notes 190–211 and accompanying text. 
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on violation of fiduciary duties (specifically, waste and loyalty suits) rep-
resent the most useful legal tools currently available to shareholders for 
promoting directorial transparency and accountability regarding cor-
porate political speech decisions.173 
A. Political Donations Are Rarely in the Best Interests of the 
Corporation and Its Shareholders 
 Despite the longstanding entrenchment of shareholder primacy in 
American corporate law, most often a corporation’s donations to can-
didates for political office will not increase shareholder value.174 And at 
worst, a contribution has the potential to gravely hurt a corporation’s 
stock price (as was the case for Target in the summer of 2010).175 To be 
sure, some corporate donations to political causes truly have a specific 
business goal in mind.176 This Section argues that generally, however, 
they do not.177 The familiar justification for political donations offered 
by management is that the corporation only supports candidates for 
public office who, if elected, will promote favorable policies for their 
business in the areas of taxation, labor standards, or environmental 
regulation, just to name a few.178 Empirical research, combined with 
some directors’ and shareholders’ personal views suggests, however, 
that this claim lacks support in practice.179 
                                                                                                                      
 
173 See infra notes 212–241 and accompanying text. 
174 See The Ctr. for Political Accountability & Zicklin Ctr. for Bus. Ethics Re-
search, The Wharton Sch., Nationwide Survey of Members of Corporate Boards 
of Directors: Attitudes Towards and Awareness Of: Campaign Finance Laws, Cor-
porate Oversight of Political Spending and Activity, and Proposed Reforms 6 
(2008) [hereinafter Nationwide Survey], available at http://www.politicalaccountability. 
net/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/919. In a 2008 survey, 255 members of boards 
of directors of Russell 2000 companies were interviewed and asked about their opinions 
with regard to corporate political spending. Id. When asked whether their company or 
industry’s political advocacy and spending resulted in favorable legislative, regulatory, or 
tax treatment, a mere twenty-nine percent responded in the affirmative. Id. 
175 See Webb, supra note 37. 
176 See, e.g., Marsili v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 313, 317, 321 (Ct. App. 1975) 
(involving a $10,000 corporate contribution to a group advocating against a ballot measure 
that would have increased the company’s taxes by over $1 million annually). 
177 See infra notes 178–189 and accompanying text. 
178 See Allen, supra note 28; Mooney, supra note 168; Tobin, supra note 66. Even in his 
apology for damaging Target’s reputation and bottom line, Target’s CEO Greg Steinhafel 
offered this familiar refrain in support of the donation: “The intent of our political contri-
bution to MN Forward was to support economic growth and job creation.” Scheck, supra 
note 39. 
179 See Nationwide Survey, supra note 174, at 6 (discussing directors’ opinions); Ra-
jesh K. Aggarwal et al., Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency? 21 ( Jan. 
2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=972670; Jeffrey M. 
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 Analysis of the traditional justification for political donations re-
veals how attenuated the relationship between donations and favorable 
treatment of businesses really is.180 Take Target’s donation to MN For-
ward as an example: first, the company decided to support a particular 
advocacy group allegedly based on its mission and policy goals; second, 
that group used the funds to support certain candidates running for 
public office; third, these funds, often spent on advertisements, failed 
to influence voting behavior and the candidate was not elected; and 
finally, even if MN Forward’s candidate had been elected, he still may 
not have voted according to the wishes of his corporate supporters.181 
Additionally, even if the candidate had been elected and had furthered 
Target’s desired policies, there would still be substantial risk of con-
sumer fallout, particularly because the candidate held controversial po-
litical and social views.182 
 Furthermore, because the law generally does not discriminate be-
tween competitors within a particular industry, any policies that are 
“pro-business” will often inure both to the benefit of the contributing 
corporation as well as to that corporation’s biggest rivals.183 It should 
also be noted that many corporations donate general treasury funds to 
organizations supporting both political parties, presumably in order to 
“hedge” their bets in hopes of currying favor with whichever party con-
trols the federal or state offices most affecting a corporation’s busi-
ness.184 Companies that engage in this practice raise serious doubts 
                                                                                                                      
 
Drope & Wendy L. Hansen, Futility and Free Riding: Corporate Political Participation and Taxa-
tion Rates in the United States, 10 Bus. & Pol., no. 3, 2008, art. 2, at 17 (finding no evidence 
that political donations are investments in political capital and that donations are nega-
tively correlated with returns); Aggarwal, supra note 27 (“[M]ost studies have actually 
found a very weak relationship, or none at all, between political contributions and floor 
votes in Congress.”); see also The Ctr. for Political Accountability, Corporate Po-
litical Spending: A Survey of American Shareholders 17 (2006) [hereinafter Survey 
of American Shareholders], available at http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index. 
php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/918 (finding that 67% of shareholders surveyed be-
lieved large political contributions and heavy spending on lobbying efforts were inappro-
priate and that 79% of shareholders disapproved of corporate political contributions that 
support special interest groups with social agendas that have nothing to do with issues that 
impact the corporation’s business or shareholder value). 
180 See Aggarwal et al., supra note 179, at 21. 
181 See id. 
182 See Aggarwal, supra note 27 (describing a corporation’s decision to support a spe-
cific candidate in an election as “choosing to enter a minefield”). 
183 See Aggarwal et al., supra note 179, at 21. In this scenario, the competitors will enjoy 
the same favorable regulatory environment as the donor, but the donor will foot the bill. 
See id. 
184 See, e.g., Brody Mullins & Alicia Mundy, Corporate Political Giving Swings Toward the 
GOP, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 2010, at A5. For example, during the first half of 2009, AT&T 
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about whether they are truly, as they claim, supporting candidates with 
“pro-business agendas.”185 
 Besides the questionable nature of what benefit a corporation ul-
timately may receive in exchange for a political contribution, many 
shareholders believe that corporate directors and officers frequently 
pledge corporate funds for ideological or personal reasons, rather than 
to promote the best interests of the corporation’s stockholders.186 In 
fact, a 2006 survey asked 800 Americans owning stock or mutual funds 
whether they believed that corporate management contributes com-
pany funds to advance their own private, political interests rather than 
the interests of the company and its shareholders.187 Troublingly, sev-
enty-three percent of those surveyed agreed, and nearly half “strongly 
agreed.”188 Whether this perception accurately reflects the actual po-
litical spending practices of corporate leaders is up for debate; yet, this 
data shows quite clearly the suspicion with which shareholders viewed 
political donations four years before Citizens United and more broadly 
reflects modern shareholders’ disenchantment with corporate partici-
pation in the political arena.189 
                                                                                                                      
donated its $1.1 million in PAC contributions equally between Republican and Democratic 
candidates. Id. 
185 Francis Bingham, Note, Show Me the Money: Public Access and Accountability After Citi-
zens United, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1027, 1055 (2011); see Winkler, supra note 13, at 1265 (discuss-
ing management’s “attempt to open a candidate’s eyes to corporate needs” as a characteri-
zation of purchasing political influence). Assuming that corporations seek returns on their 
donations through favorable regulatory, tax, or environmental policies, donating equally 
to both parties shows that promoting a particular candidate’s policies are not really what 
these corporations are after. See id. Rather, donation “hedging” implies that, whichever 
candidate wins, the corporation hopes to use their support as leverage to influence that 
official’s voting behavior. See id. This argument was made explicitly—and successfully—by 
the directors of GE in Stern v. General Electric Co., in the context of donations made to un-
opposed or strongly favored candidates: “the benefits derived . . . include . . . the election 
of candidates open to GE’s position on various issues; and the maintenance and improve-
ment of GE’s relationship with members of Congress.” 837 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), 
aff’d, 23 F.3d 746 (2d Cir. 1994). This practice suggests that GE’s board was more con-
cerned with donating to candidates who would ultimately be elected, rather than those 
who would support pro-business policies. See id. 
186 See Survey of American Shareholders, supra note 179, at 19; Tobin, supra note 
66. 
187 Survey of American Shareholders, supra note 179, at 19. 
188 Id. 
189 See id. It is possible that shareholders’ heightened alert to conflicts of interest has 
been at least partially motivated by recent instances of alleged self-serving by corporate 
executives. See Mooney, supra note 168. 
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B. Internal Mechanisms of Corporate Governance Are  
Inadequate to Protect Shareholder Value 
 As discussed in Part II, one way in which shareholders may re-
spond to wasteful or self-interested political spending is by using the 
traditional outlets of internal corporate governance.190 In practice, 
however, these tools offer shareholders little opportunity to meaning-
fully influence corporate policies and decision making.191 Corporate 
law scholars have proposed amendments to corporate governance rules 
to address the expressive concerns raised in Citizens United.192 Their 
proposals offer another path toward promoting directorial accountabil-
ity for political speech decisions and highlight the serious inadequacies 
of the internal corporate governance tools currently available to share-
holders.193 These scholars observe that current, default corporate law 
rules treat decisions to engage in political spending as ordinary busi-
ness decisions, subject to the presumptive weight of the business judg-
ment rule.194 Therefore, shareholders have no way to actually partici-
pate in these decisions whatsoever: they usually may not vote or submit 
a proposal to limit or prohibit these donations, and they do not enjoy 
the benefit of mandatory disclosure rules when these contributions are 
made.195 
 Furthermore, the argument that shareholders can control political 
speech decisions through the election of directors is also somewhat il-
lusory.196 First, although shareholders must have access to sufficient 
information regarding a corporation’s activity in this area to cast an 
informed vote, current disclosure rules make dissemination of this in-
formation optional, not mandatory.197 Second, this argument assumes 
that shareholders are “one-issue voters.”198 For example, a shareholder 
may be unhappy with the political speech decisions a director has made 
                                                                                                                      
190 See supra notes 90–113 and accompanying text. 
191 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 87–88. 
192 See id. at 97–107. Namely, these concerns surround the compulsion of shareholders 
to speak (through political donations) in ways with which they might not otherwise. See id. 
193 See id. at 87–89. 
194 See id. at 87. 
195 See id.; see also SEC Shareholder Proposals Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011). 
196 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 100. 
197 See id. at 104–05. A caveat, as discussed supra, could be a books and records action. 
See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220 (Supp. 2010). In a sense, this option could counteract the 
unwillingness of a corporation to disclose the details of its political endeavors, providing 
shareholders with an internal source of information that would otherwise be shielded 
from public view. See id. 
198 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 100. 
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but believe that the director has otherwise done a good job.199 In this 
scenario, the shareholder would be forced to decide whether those de-
cisions outweigh the otherwise positive performance of the director; 
director elections, in other words, do not address specific political 
speech issues in a targeted, precise way.200 The result is that many criti-
cal decisions (with both expressive and business importance) are left 
wholly unsupervised and uninformed by shareholder preferences, al-
lowing competition with other companies making political donations 
and self-dealing to seriously compromise the financial well-being of a 
company.201 
 Scholars argue that corporate law should accommodate the pre-
rogatives of shareholders and management by expanding shareholder 
voting rights to better align the speech and business interests of the two 
groups.202 For example, one such proposal introduced in Congress 
would require a corporation to obtain shareholder approval for politi-
cal contributions in excess of $50,000.203 Some scholars argue that this 
form of regulation, although positive, would fail to account for the ex-
pressive component of corporate political speech because shareholders 
would still be unable to directly affect political spending decisions be-
low that threshold.204 
 This particular shortcoming also reveals why fiduciary law would be 
poorly suited to serving shareholders’ more nuanced, expressive view-
points.205 In a sense, waste or loyalty suits would act as much more 
                                                                                                                      
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 See Lotterman, supra note 30; Webb, supra note 37. What is even more troubling is 
that many large corporations today leave these political speech decisions to lower-level 
management; in fact, a recent study revealed that only one-third of the 100 largest compa-
nies in the United States require political contributions to be approved by a company’s 
board of directors, up from less than one percent just two years before. See Bebchuk & 
Jackson, supra note 12, at 88. As Target learned firsthand, these highly charged decisions 
should not be left to management, given the catastrophic repercussions they could have 
on a corporation’s financial stability. See id. (citing Bruce F. Freed & Jamie Carroll, 
Open Windows: How Codes of Conduct Regulate Corporate Political Spending 
and a Model Code to Protect Company Interests and Shareholder Value 15 & n.18 
(2007)). 
202 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 111. 
203 See id. at 98 (citing the Shareholder Protection Act of 2010, H.R. Rep. No. 111-620, pt. 
1, at 2 (2010)). Rules like this have been in place in the United Kingdom for over a decade 
and studies conducted after that legislation was adopted showed that spending fell following 
its adoption. Id. (citing Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act, 2000, c. 41, §§ 139–
140 (U.K.)). 
204 See id. at 99. 
205 See id. 
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“blunt” weapons against the rise of corporate political spending.206 Be-
cause shareholders could avail themselves of fiduciary law only when 
political speech decisions bear little to no relation to the business inter-
ests of the corporation, this tool would not be sensitive enough to cap-
ture any expressive dissatisfaction shareholders might have with these 
contributions on a case-by-case basis, or before they are actually made.207 
 Despite this admitted shortcoming, fiduciary suits offer several ad-
vantages that could greatly reduce the level of divergence between 
shareholders and management with respect to political speech deci-
sions.208 If successful, shareholders would obtain a voice in the board 
room, rather than in a more reactive setting, such as in a shareholder 
vote before a contribution is made.209 Furthermore, as scholars point 
out in support of enhanced voting rights, fiduciary duty suits would not 
necessarily reduce the quantity of a corporation’s political activity.210 
Rather, such suits would ensure that decisions to support political caus-
es are truly aligned with shareholder interests, which directors are 
charged with promoting.211 
C. Fiduciary Law Represents the Best Shareholder Tool Currently Available to 
Respond to Wasteful or Self-Interested Political Spending 
 Given the present inadequacy of internal mechanisms of share-
holder control over the American corporation, fiduciary law represents 
the best way to ensure managerial accountability when companies sup-
port political campaigns.212 Engrained in the American tradition of 
corporate law is the notion that corporations exist for the purpose of 
serving their shareholders by generating wealth by increasing the value 
of their residual shares of ownership in the firm.213 Indeed, legal rules 
                                                                                                                      
206 See Mitchell & Mitchell, supra note 116, at 136–37. 
207 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 99. These suits, however, would have the 
advantage of focusing on one particular issue—political spending—and therefore would 
offer a more sensitive approach than other remedial tools, such as voting for new direc-
tors, voting to eliminate political speech altogether, or selling shares. See id. 
208 See id. 
209 See id. at 101 (acknowledging the objection that shareholder voting could produce 
wasteful transaction costs as more and more issues are reserved for shareholder approval 
rather than being entrusted to directorial discretion). 
210 See id. at 111. It seems likely, however, that successful suits would at least limit the 
growth of such spending in the years following Citizens United. See id. 
211 See id. 
212 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978); Epstein, supra note 
34, at 656 (observing that it is an “open question” whether corporate political contribu-
tions may violate directors’ fiduciary duties). 
213 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
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such as limited liability and perpetual existence were created to further 
this very goal.214 When corporations reach beyond this fundamental 
objective, however, and use capital obtained from shareholders to ex-
pand their influence in largely nonbusiness enterprises, directors 
should be held to answer for their decisions’ harmful effects.215 Present 
corporate law rules could provide redress for shareholders aggrieved by 
this form of managerial misconduct and ensure that shareholder value 
remains the core concern of corporate leadership.216 
 First, shareholders could argue that political donations are effec-
tively a waste of corporate assets.217 Delaware courts have held that 
shareholders must allege an “exchange that is so one sided that no 
business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the 
corporation has received adequate consideration.”218 An alternate for-
mulation of this test has also been affirmed in recent Delaware deci-
sions that hold that “where business judgment presumptions are appli-
cable, the board’s decision will be upheld unless it cannot be attributed 
to any rational business purpose . . . .”219 In either case, the controlling 
issue will be whether the possibility of favorable business policies in the 
future represents sufficient consideration to sustain the transaction.220 
In any other business setting, such an illusory return would almost nev-
er justify such use of corporate funds.221 
                                                                                                                      
 
214 Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658–59 (1990). 
State law grants corporations special advantages—such as limited liability, 
perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution 
of assets—that enhance their ability to attract capital and to deploy their re-
sources in ways that maximize the return on their shareholders’ investments. 
These state-created advantages not only allow corporations to play a domi-
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amassed in the economic marketplace” to obtain “an unfair advantage in the 
political marketplace.” 
Id. (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)). 
215 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795. 
216 See infra notes 217–241 and accompanying text. 
217 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d at 693, 748–49 (Del. Ch. 
2005); Epstein, supra note 34, at 656. 
218 Disney, 907 A.2d at 693, 748–49 (citations omitted). 
219 Hampshire Group, Ltd. v. Kuttner, C.A. No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *35 
n.299 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2010) (citing Disney, 906 A.2d at 74). Presumably, this refers to 
situations that do not involve allegations of self-interest or duty of loyalty violations, which 
are generally not subject to the deferential business judgment rule. See id. 
220 See id. 
221 See id. It is also worth noting that corporate political contributions are easily distin-
guishable from corporate donations to charity, which are deemed permissible under Dela-
ware statutory law. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 122(9) (Supp. 2010). Returning to the ex-
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 One recent case from the Delaware Court of Chancery provides 
guidance on the Delaware courts’ treatment of the corporate waste 
doctrine.222 In the 2009 case In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Lit-
igation, the Chancery Court refused to dismiss the shareholder-
plaintiffs’ claim of corporate waste for agreeing to a multi-million dol-
lar compensation package for the company’s outgoing CEO.223 Citi-
group offers hope for shareholders wishing to challenge corporations’ 
use of general treasury funds to support political endeavors because 
these donations resemble ordinary business decisions even less than 
the allegedly wasteful conduct of the directors in Citigroup—paying its 
employees.224 In return for compensating a CEO, a corporation (usu-
ally) receives the services of a highly educated, highly qualified, accom-
plished business leader—a benefit received by that corporation 
alone.225 In contrast, a corporation that donates to a political advocacy 
group receives nothing more than a lottery ticket; even worse, this 
ticket carries extremely remote chances of paying out a tangible return, 
and also carries a significant risk of inflicting damage to that company’s 
reputation.226 And even if the ticket pays off and pro-business policies 
are enacted, the corporation will likely be forced to share these win-
nings with its fiercest competitors.227 
 Shareholder challenges to a corporation’s political contributions 
could also take the form of duty of loyalty claims.228 When officers or 
directors exploit their positions of power to further their own political 
or personal interests, this should be a plain violation of their fiduciary 
                                                                                                                      
ample discussed in Part I.A., if Target’s management had pledged corporate funds to the 
American Red Cross rather than MN Forward, it is highly unlikely that its customers would 
have boycotted Target’s stores because of this decision. See supra notes 29--49 and accom-
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American Red Cross for Tornado Relief (Apr. 29, 2011), http://pressroom.target.com/pr 
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222 In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138–39 (Del. Ch. 
2009); see Steven Caywood, Note, Wasting the Corporate Waste Doctrine: How the Doctrine Can 
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223 Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138–39. 
224 Id. 
225 See id. 
226 See Aggarwal, supra note 27. 
227 See Aggarwal et al., supra note 179, at 21. 
228 See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009); Yosifon, supra 
note 146, at 1228–29. 
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obligations to a corporation’s shareholders.229 Delaware law requires 
that directors carry out their duties free from self-interested motives.230 
Subordinating the interests of shareholders in a company’s growth in 
favor of a director’s own political or social views is not only an abuse of 
the trust relationship necessary to the proper functioning of the corpo-
ration, but it is also a clear violation of Delaware law.231 
 Evidence of the sanctity of the duty of loyalty shines through in 
section 102(b)(7) of Delaware’s corporate code, which makes violations 
of the duty of loyalty non-exculpable.232 Section 220, which permits 
shareholders (armed with a proper purpose) to inspect a corporation’s 
books and records, also provides shareholders with a critical tool neces-
sary to investigate and pursue allegations of corporate wrongdoing.233 
Moreover, Justice Carolyn Berger of the Delaware Supreme Court re-
cently implied that defending a derivative suit—regardless of its out-
come—can be a deterrent to managerial overreaching.234 
 Finally, perhaps the best argument in favor of using fiduciary law 
as a mechanism for promoting directorial accountability is that it can 
be implemented immediately.235 Some authors’ proposals require legis-
lative action either on the federal or state level.236 Fiduciary law, on the 
                                                                                                                      
 
229 Lyondell, 970 A.2d at 243–44. 
230 See id.; see also Tobin, supra note 66. 
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At least one could argue that what was going on in Disney was in the nature of 
preaching, maybe even that an intermediate step between zero liability and 
finding liability is that you get a seven-week trial, all of your directors are 
turned upside down, and you pay attorneys’ fees. You really don’t want your 
company to go through that, do you? So, at the end of the day, there was no 
damage award. But I think the Disney trial certainly sent a message in terms of 
what directors should or shouldn’t do with respect to compensation. 
Id. 
235 See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 795; Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 136; Victor Brudney, Business Cor-
porations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 Yale L.J. 235, 257–58 (1981). 
236 See Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 12, at 97. Four elements of corporate govern-
ance could be reformed to increase shareholder participation in corporate political 
speech decision making: (1) the role of shareholders, (2) the role of directors, (3) the 
allowance of shareholders to opt out of default arrangements set by the legislature, and 
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other hand, offers a ready-made vehicle for shareholders to ensure that 
directors of a corporation are making political speech decisions that 
are in their best interests.237 The wheels of the legislative process often 
move slowly, as often they should.238 Suits based on waste of assets or 
violations of the duty of loyalty, however, require no change in the law; 
in fact, American courts have, for the most part, reaffirmed their im-
portance throughout the past century.239 The longevity of these types 
of claims is a testament to fiduciary laws’ flexibility, widespread applica-
bility, and absolute necessity to ensure efficient, transparent capital 
markets.240 There is no reason why these duties cannot adequately 
serve the interests of shareholders today—as they have for decades—to 
protect the value of their investments from managerial self-interest and 
corporate waste.241 
                                                                                                                     
Conclusion 
 When directors, officers, or managers appropriate funds from a 
corporation’s general treasury to engage in corporate political speech 
having little or nothing to do with its business development, these indi-
viduals violate their fiduciary duties to the company’s shareholders. Al-
though directors are traditionally entitled to a presumption that they 
have satisfied their fiduciary obligations in the course of making ordi-
nary business decisions, voluntarily choosing to engage a corporation 
in highly divisive public debates rarely furthers a legitimate business 
interest; for that reason, political activities should fall outside the pro-
tection of this general rule. Furthermore, internal mechanisms of 
shareholder involvement in corporate governance have proved inade-
quate to quell the rise of these potentially disastrous political donations. 
For these reasons, an alternate path is needed. Legislative responses to 
 
(4) the expansion of disclosure requirements to reduce the incidence of concealed con-
tributions made through “‘conduit’ entities.” See id. at 97–107. 
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238 See id. at 107. 
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raise the bar for plaintiff-shareholders seeking to overcome business judgment presump-
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the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United may ultimately reduce 
the need for legal means of redress, but until then, fiduciary law should 
provide injured shareholders the opportunity to hold corporate leaders 
accountable when shareholders’ faith and trust have been violated. 
Jonathan Romiti 
